Peer-reviewed journal articles:
10) Virtue’s cosmos: Enaction as an anthropology of eschatology, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory (with Muhammad Ahmed bin Tariq), Vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring 2022), pp. 141-153.
We consider a reading group in Pakistan that discusses the end of the time by looking at the eschatological prophecies in Islamic religious sources. We consider how our interlocutors relate the question of ethics and ethical cultivation to political justice and cosmology. Accordingly, our discussion positions itself against those works in anthropology of ethics that primarily view such ethical actions in terms of self-cultivation.
9) Virtue after Foucault: On refuge and integration in Western Europe, European Journal of Political Theory (Online first)
I argue that genealogy and virtue ethics do not necessarily contradict each other. I find Foucault a fellow co-traveler in the tradition of virtue ethics. The discussion empirically focuses on refugees and immigrants in Western Europe.
I argue that genealogy and virtue ethics do not necessarily contradict each other. I find Foucault a fellow co-traveler in the tradition of virtue ethics. The discussion empirically focuses on refugees and immigrants in Western Europe.
8) Oikopolitics, regulation, and privacy: Reading Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life of the European Convention on Human Rights, Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 45, no. 3 (February 2019), pp. 334–355.
I argue that the idea of legal protection of private life and privacy, given right to respect for private and family life, makes sense in the context of management of private life and privacy. The consequent idea of freedom is neither simply political nor natural.
I argue that the idea of legal protection of private life and privacy, given right to respect for private and family life, makes sense in the context of management of private life and privacy. The consequent idea of freedom is neither simply political nor natural.
7) Negative governmentality through fundamental rights: The far side of the European Convention on Human Rights, European Law Journal, Vol. 24, no. 4-5 (September 2018), pp. 297-320.
I suggest that, at the systemic level, freedom is established with reference to what freedom is not. I look at the European Convention on Human Rights to comment on this point. I analyze the norms that the Convention mentions in negative terms. I look at anti-abuse provisions, limitations, and exceptions. I spell out its consequences for political and legal theory.
I suggest that, at the systemic level, freedom is established with reference to what freedom is not. I look at the European Convention on Human Rights to comment on this point. I analyze the norms that the Convention mentions in negative terms. I look at anti-abuse provisions, limitations, and exceptions. I spell out its consequences for political and legal theory.
6) Biopolitics, Thanatopolitics and the Right to Life, Theory Culture and Society, Vol. 34, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 75–95.
I focus on the interrelationship of law and life in human rights. I suggest that the right to life operates in the context of a differentiated management of life. I critique those social and political theorists who overemphasize negative dimensions of such management.
I focus on the interrelationship of law and life in human rights. I suggest that the right to life operates in the context of a differentiated management of life. I critique those social and political theorists who overemphasize negative dimensions of such management.
5) Governing (through) Religion: Reflections on Religion as Governmentality, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 42, no. 9 (November 2016), pp. 873-896.
I argue that religion is a technical thing within the context of the right to freedom of religion and that one of the effects of this right is to constitute the object ('religion') that it protects. This entails that, given the administrative state, secularism is not based on the separation of state and religion, but on the production of religion. I draw on the literature in anthropology of religion to make my points.
I argue that religion is a technical thing within the context of the right to freedom of religion and that one of the effects of this right is to constitute the object ('religion') that it protects. This entails that, given the administrative state, secularism is not based on the separation of state and religion, but on the production of religion. I draw on the literature in anthropology of religion to make my points.
4) Weighing Words: On the Governmentality of Free Speech, Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 25, no. 1 (February 2016), pp. 69-92.
I argue that free speech is contextual, is not free of legal consequences and effects, and is both an expression of and an exercise in (a kind of understanding of) freedom. I therefore take issue with those scholarly analyses of right to freedom of expression who find a zero-sum game between power and freedom.
I argue that free speech is contextual, is not free of legal consequences and effects, and is both an expression of and an exercise in (a kind of understanding of) freedom. I therefore take issue with those scholarly analyses of right to freedom of expression who find a zero-sum game between power and freedom.
3) Between the Metropole and the Postcolony: On the Dynamics of Rights’ Machinery from the Northwestern Tribal Belt to the ‘Mainland’ Pakistan, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 34, no. 6 (December 2015), pp. 1003-1021.
I argue that rights (political, human) should be considered a contextual practice, and that arguing against X in terms of rights is also an argument in favor of such a practice. The impact of such a talk is not toothless, especially in those contexts where much of those contextual variables need to be established and can not be simply presumed.
I argue that rights (political, human) should be considered a contextual practice, and that arguing against X in terms of rights is also an argument in favor of such a practice. The impact of such a talk is not toothless, especially in those contexts where much of those contextual variables need to be established and can not be simply presumed.
2) Droning, Zoning, and Organizing: Kafkaesque Reflections on the Nomos of the Earth in the Northwestern Tribal Belt of Pakistan, Space and Polity, Vol. 19, no. 3 (December 2015), pp. 273-292.
I consider the hypothesis that drone warfare should be analyzed as a symptom of 'normalization' in the backdrop of an understanding of a spatial order, and find both Schmitt and Kafka helpful in theorizing this dynamic.
I consider the hypothesis that drone warfare should be analyzed as a symptom of 'normalization' in the backdrop of an understanding of a spatial order, and find both Schmitt and Kafka helpful in theorizing this dynamic.
1) Reading Malir Cantonment in Karachi, Pakistan: Some Notes on Residential Barracks and Spatial Dynamics, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 22, no. 4. (December 2014), pp. 362-376.
I analyze the colonial discourse on cantonments in South Asia, see how changes in the post-independence period have affected it by focusing on the Pakistani city of Karachi, and argue that cantonments have emerged as high-end real estate areas because of - not despite their - colonial and postcolonial dynamics. This has some consequences for postcolonial theory and for postcolonial studies in urban geography.
I analyze the colonial discourse on cantonments in South Asia, see how changes in the post-independence period have affected it by focusing on the Pakistani city of Karachi, and argue that cantonments have emerged as high-end real estate areas because of - not despite their - colonial and postcolonial dynamics. This has some consequences for postcolonial theory and for postcolonial studies in urban geography.